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A Novel Attack-and-Defense Signaling Game for Optimal Deceptive Defense Strategy Choice

The authors extend the signaling game model into a two-way signaling game that represents the confrontation between defender and attacker, formally define the model, and propose an algorithm for identifying the refined Bayesian equilibrium. Based on calculated benefits, they analyze strategy choice and conduct a simulation to evaluate the model, with the aim of examining the use of deception-based defenses such as honeypots to improve IoT network security.

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What we know

The authors extend the signaling game model into a two-way signaling game that represents the confrontation between defender and attacker, formally define the model, and propose an algorithm for identifying the refined Bayesian equilibrium. Based on calculated benefits, they analyze strategy choice and conduct a simulation to evaluate the model, with the aim of examining the use of deception-based defenses such as honeypots to improve IoT network security.

Evidence limits

Review based only on the publisher-deposited abstract; the full text was not examined and results were not independently validated.

Reviewed: author abstract. Full-text results were not analyzed.

Sources and provenance

  1. A Novel Attack-and-Defense Signaling Game for Optimal Deceptive Defense Strategy Choice
    abstract · 2026-10-11

Reviewed: 2026-10-13. This record may change when new evidence is found.

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