Paper

Towards a Cognitive Theory of Cyber Deception

This work is an initial step toward a cognitive theory of cyber deception, focusing on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable. The authors use an abstract cybersecurity game (Insider Attack Game) with behavioral experiments and an instance-based learning model within the ACT-R cognitive architecture to examine how human attackers make decisions under deceptive signaling and to compare outcomes with a perfectly rational adversary.

What we know

This work is an initial step toward a cognitive theory of cyber deception, focusing on the cyber domain where physical cues are unavailable. The authors use an abstract cybersecurity game (Insider Attack Game) with behavioral experiments and an instance-based learning model within the ACT-R cognitive architecture to examine how human attackers make decisions under deceptive signaling and to compare outcomes with a perfectly rational adversary.

Evidence limits

Review based solely on the deposited Crossref abstract; no access to the full text and no independent validation of results.

Reviewed: author abstract. Full-text results were not analyzed.

Sources and provenance

  1. Towards a Cognitive Theory of Cyber Deception
    abstract · 2026-10-11

Reviewed: 2026-10-13. This record may change when new evidence is found.

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